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Biological motion and human morphology prime infants’ categorization  





     Infants as young as 9 months of age categorize objects at a global level of inclusiveness (i.e., 
animals versus vehicles [Mandler & McDonough, 1993; Oakes, Madole, & Cohen, 1991]) but 
not at the basic level (i.e., dogs versus fish [Mandler & McDonough, 1993]). To test the 
hypothesis that priming infants with morphological and dynamic cues could influence their 
ability to categorize, 10-month-olds were exposed to either a point-light display video of a 
human walking, a video containing a rotating image of a human body, or a control video of 
randomly moving point-light dots. Following priming, infants completed a basic-level 
categorization task as well as gaze following and object retrieval tasks. Results revealed that only 
biological motion and human morphology primed infants’ ability to categorize animate, but not 
inanimate pairs, nor gaze following or object retrieval abilities. These findings suggest that both 
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Biological motion and human morphology prime infants’ categorization of basic-level categories 
 
      
        Categorization is one of the most fundamental cognitive processes infants engage in when 
they first begin to explore the world around them.  Over the last two decades, empirical 
investigations have demonstrated that infants are remarkably successful at forming categories at 
varying levels of inclusiveness (Mandler, 2000, 1993; Oakes, Madole, & Cohen, 1991; Pauen, 
2002; Quinn & Eimas, 1996). At the broadest level, the animate-inanimate (A/I) distinction 
requires the ability to differentiate animates, such as humans and animals, from inanimates, such 
as furniture and vehicles. This important ontological distinction provides the building blocks for 
the mind’s representation of all objects and beings in the world (Rakison & Poulin-Dubois, 
2001). Superordinate categories include a subset of objects from the A/I domain, for example, 
animals and furniture or humans and vehicles. At a less inclusive level, basic-level categories 
contrast different types of superordinate level objects, for example dogs and birds.  
Empirical examinations of infants’ categorization abilities to date support the notion that 
infants learn categories in a top-down manner, from superordinate to basic-level (Mandler, 
Bauer, & McDonough, 1991; Pauen, 2002; Poulin-Dubois, Graham, & Sippola, 1995). Using the 
sequential touching and object examination procedures, several cross sectional and longitudinal 
studies conducted with infants 7 to 30 months of age have shown that superordinate categories 
are a prerequisite for the development of less inclusive basic-level categories (Mandler & Bauer, 
1988; Mandler, Bauer & McDonough, 1991; Mandler & McDonough, 1993, 1998; Poulin-
Dubois, Graham & Sippola, 1995; Pauen, 2002). While these studies provide strong evidence for 
a superordinate-to-basic-level shift in category development, additional evidence suggests that 
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the sequence of categorization development in infancy may begin at the animate-inanimate level 
(i.e. an animate-inanimate-to-superordinate-to-basic-level sequence).  
Using a familiarization-novelty preference procedure Quinn and Eimas (1998) found that 
3- and 4-month-olds’ categorization of humans tended to be too broad as it included members of 
the animal kingdom (e.g. cats, horses and fish). Although infants possessed a broader concept of 
‘humans’ than older children and adults they differentiated the human category from inanimate 
objects such as cars. Thus, this finding provides an important basis for the current study as it 
suggests that by 3 and 4 months of age, infants are tuned into the various perceptual features (e.g. 
morphology and motion) which differentiate animates from inanimates.  
In a first study to investigate infants’ ability to generalize motion properties of people 
across the animate domain, Poulin-Dubois, Frenkiel-Fishman, Nayer, and Johnson (2006) 
examined whether infants generalize animate motion properties (e.g. self-propelled motion, etc.) 
from humans to non-human animals. Using an imitation procedure, the experimenter 
demonstrated various actions using people. Infants were next given the choice to either use 
animals or vehicles to imitate the actions. It was found that both 16- and 20-month-old infants 
were more likely to use animals, than vehicles, to imitate actions demonstrated by the 
experimenter. This research provided the first evidence to suggest that infants as young as 16 
months of age possess knowledge regarding the common motion properties of animates.  
In another investigation, Rostad, Yott and Poulin-Dubois (submitted) tested 14- and 18- 
month-old infants’ animate-inanimate categorization abilities using the sequential touching 
procedure. It was found that 18-month-olds successfully categorized at the A-I level, while 14-
month-olds possessed an emerging appreciation for the animate-inanimate distinction.  A second 
experiment using a modified sequential touching procedure revealed that 14-month-old infants’ 
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successfully differentiated animate-inanimate categories. This task used an array of hybrid 
switched-parts objects, including a person with wheels, and a vehicle with legs. Fourteen month-
old infants’ preferred to categorize hybrid objects according to their ontological animate-
inanimate status, rather than their parts (e.g. legs vs. wheels). Taken together, these studies 
provide preliminary evidence that animate-inanimate categorization abilities emerge before, or at 
least around the same time as, superordinate level abilities. 
While the developmental sequence of different category contrasts in infancy has been well 
researched (e.g. the global-to-basic-level shift), much less is known about the types of 
information infants use to accomplish the challenging task of forming category concepts. It has 
been hypothesized that infants form conceptual categories by extracting both static 
morphological and dynamic features of objects and use this information to determine an object’s 
category membership (Mandler, 1992; Rakison & Poulin-Dubois, 2001). While it may be 
possible to categorize perceptually dissimilar objects using morphology alone (e.g. 
differentiation of animals and vehicles using component parts or shape), the differentiation of 
perceptually similar objects (e.g. birds and airplanes) likely requires more sophisticated 
knowledge of dynamic attributes. In an experiment designed to control for perceptual similarity 
of objects, Mandler and McDonough (1993) tested whether 9- and 11-month-old infants 
differentiate perceptually similar, but ontologically different, objects – birds and airplanes. To 
increase the perceptual similarity of the stimuli all birds had outstretched wings and two 
airplanes had markings which resembled mouths, teeth and eyes. Using the object examination 
procedure, both 9- and 11-month-old infants successfully categorized birds and airplanes. These 
results suggest that infants extract other information in addition to object morphology when 
making categorical distinctions. Mandler (2004) hypothesized that the perception of motion 
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characteristics provide infants with conceptual knowledge about the “kinds of things” objects 
are. Specifically, she proposed that infants’ animate-inanimate conceptual categories are formed 
on the basis of differentiating objects capable of self-starting, moving non-linearly, and causing 
action at a distance from those which cannot.  
Building on the work of Mandler and her predecessors (Premack, 1990; Leslie, 1995), 
Rakison and Poulin-Dubois (2001) proposed that the foundation for the animate-inanimate 
distinction in infancy relies on the following five animate motion cues: a) onset of motion (self-
propelled vs. caused motion), b) type of causal role (agent vs. recipient), c) form of causal action 
(action at a distance vs. action from contact), d) pattern of interaction (contingent vs. non-
contingent), and e) line of trajectory (irregular vs. smooth). The current research was designed to 
examine the proposition that an additional animacy cue – type of motion (biological vs. non 
biological) also facilitates A-I categorization in infancy. Biological motion is defined as “the 
motion patterns characteristic of living organisms in locomotion” (Johansson, 1973). Humans’ 
perception of biological motion has been studied using both point-light displays (e.g. Bertenthal, 
Proffitt, & Cutting, 1984; Johansson, 1973; Simion, Regolin, & Bulf, 2008; Troje & Chang, 
2010; Troje & Westhoff, 2006), and animated schematics of ordinary shapes (Schlottmann & 
Ray, 2010; Schlottmann & Surian, 1999). Although both types of stimuli capture the essence of 
biological motion (e.g. non-rigid, rhythmic motion), point-light displays also contain discernible 
structure-from-motion features as well as local gravitational features (Troje, 2008).   
Evidence suggesting that infants are sensitive to biological motion has been found in two 
day-old newborn infants who are able to discriminate between biological motion point-light 
displays depicting the movement of a hen and random motion (Simion, Regolin, & Bulf, 2008). 
Infants in this study also preferred to look at upright, as opposed to up-side-down, biological 
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motion displays. The fact that neonates preferred to look at the upright motion of hens suggests 
that humans are innately sensitive to the particular motion signatures of biological motion. 
According to Troje and Westhoff (2006) the human visual system is sensitive to the gravity-
defined dynamic characteristics of terrestrial animals in locomotion. At a local level, the 
rhythmic, pendulum-like motion of limbs is unlikely to be produced by inanimate objects. Thus, 
both structure-from-motion and local movement of point-light features (e.g. limbs) provides 
sufficient cues for infants to differentiate biological and non-biological motion.  
  Research testing older infants has shown that by one year of age infants are able to extract 
important social-cognitive information from biological motion. Yoon and Johnson (2009) found 
that 12-month-old infants follow the “gaze” of a human point-light figure who turned to observe 
a target, despite the absence of morphological features such as eyes or a face. This research 
suggests that early on biological motion perception is closely integrated with the development of 
social-cognitive abilities. 
Additional evidence that infants extract animacy cues from biological motion has been 
provided by Schlottmann and Ray (2010) who used animated schematics of biological motion. In 
this study, 6-month-old infants were habituated to a square moving toward one of two targets. 
When the targets switched locations at test, infants looked longer when the square moved toward 
a new goal than a new location, but only if the square moved non-rigidly and rhythmically. 
These results suggest that infants as young as 6 months of age already link biological motion and 
goal directedness, thus demonstrating an emerging understanding that things which move 
biologically possess various animate characteristics (e.g. goal directedness, intentionality, etc.). 
Taken together, the research discussed above provides confirmatory evidence that in the first 
year of life infants perceive biological motion as animate and are capable of extracting rich 
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social information, including internal states such as goals and intentions. However, the notion 
that biological motion perception is integral to infants’ differentiation of animate and inanimate 
concepts has received little empirical attention.  
In one of the only studies to examine infants’ use of biological motion information in a 
categorization task Arterberry and Bornstein (2002) found that 9-month-old infants categorize at 
the global level (animals vs. vehicles) when stimuli combine both static and dynamic attributes. 
In this study, a series of habituation-transfer experiments examined whether 6- and 9-month-old 
infants categorize animals and vehicles based on static or dynamic attributes of stimuli. Infants 
were either habituated to static images and tested with dynamic point-light displays containing 
one same-category and one out-of-category stimulus, or habituated to dynamic point-light 
displays and tested with static images containing one same-category and one out-of-category 
stimulus.  Results revealed that only 9-month-olds were able to transfer dynamic category 
information to static images, however, they were not able to transfer static category information 
to dynamic displays. Thus, infants who generalized the habituation response from point-light 
displays of animal motion to static images of animals were believed to do so on the basis of 
conceptual knowledge of both animal morphology and biological motion properties. This 
experiment provides a background for the current study in that it demonstrates that biological 
motion point-light displays can be used in categorization tasks with infants as young as 9 months 
of age. While Arterberry and Bornstein were able to demonstrate the sophistication of infants’ 
category concepts by showing that 9-month-olds already associate static and dynamic attributes 
of objects, their experiment did not address the question of whether infants’ ability to categorize 
animate and inanimate objects is facilitated by the use of dynamic information.  
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The main goal of the current experiment was to shed light on the object features that help 
infants form taxonomic categories. In order to do so, we examined whether priming infants with 
biological motion or human morphology would facilitate their performance on an animate, but 
not inanimate, object categorization task. For this investigation, a task assessing infants’ basic-
level categorization was selected in order to allow for improvement following administration of 
the priming stimuli. Previous research using the object examination procedure suggests that 
global categories are already mastered by 10 months of age, however, basic-level categories are 
just beginning to emerge (Mandler & McDonough, 1993, 1998). In this study, 80% of 9-month-
old infants were successful at global contrasts (animals vs. vehicles) while infants’ performance 
on basic-level contrasts (types of animals or furniture) ranged from 30-50%.    
We hypothesized that infants’ categorization of basic-level animate pairs (dog vs. fish or 
dog vs. bird) would be facilitated by human biological motion and human morphology priming 
conditions, while categorization of basic-level inanimate pairs (chair vs. bed or chair vs. table) 
would be unaffected by the priming conditions. Furthermore, we hypothesized that this 
facilitation effect would be specific to categorization abilities, and thus, neither the biological 
motion nor the morphology condition would influence infants’ performance on control tasks 
measuring socio-cognitive and executive functioning abilities. If categorization of animal 
contrasts was facilitated by human biological motion and morphology this would demonstrate 
that infants generalize biological motion characteristics across the animate domain (including 
both animals and humans). In addition, these results would suggest that infants possess a 








 A total of 97 infants were recruited using birth lists from a public health-service agency. 
All infants were born within the normal gestational period and experienced no birth 
complications or reported hearing difficulties. The first language spoken at home was either 
English (n=42) or French (n= 55) and infants were tested in their respective mother tongue. Of 
the original sample, 64 infants were included in the final analysis (M age= 10.23 months [SD= 
0.53]; 32 male). Thirty-three additional infants were excluded due to: fussiness (n= 11), failure to 
habituate to priming stimuli (n= 20; Biological Motion [n=3], Human Morphology [n=7], 
Random Motion [n=10]) and parental interference (n= 2).  
Materials 
MCDI-SF. The short version of the MacArthur-Bates Communicative Development 
Inventory – Level II (MCDI-SF; Fenson et al., 2000) is an 89-item vocabulary checklist used by 
parents to indicate words their infant comprehends and produces. A French translation of the 
MCDI was used to assess language development in infants primarily exposed to French 
(Trudeau, Frank, & Poulin-Dubois, 1999). The total number of words the infant comprehends is 
used as an estimate of receptive vocabulary, while the total number of words the infant produces 
is used as an estimate of expressive vocabulary. A total score is calculated by summing the 
number of words used both expressively and receptively.  
Video Prime Stimuli. 
Biological Motion.  The human point-light walker video was composed of 11 point-light dots 
placed on all the major joints of the body (Figure 1). The walker moved rightward with no 
horizontal translation, as if walking on a treadmill. In the creation of the human walker, motion 
capture data consisting of 20 steps (10 gait cycles) was taken from a human subject who walked 
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at a comfortable pace on a treadmill. Eleven marker positions were used to capture the subject’s 
motion at all the major joints of the body. These markers convey important information about 
both the structure of the body (where the various joints and bones are located) and the dynamic 
movements of each part (e.g. the velocity of the arm swing vs. the stability of the trunk). Next, 
the dimensionality of the subject’s postures were reduced using principal components analysis 
and the final video was rendered using BODYBUILDER software (Oxford Metrics) (see Troje, 
2002, for a detailed description of the creation of the clip). The final video consisted of one 15 
second trial which contained 30 complete cycles of the person walking (0.5 seconds/cycle).  
Human Morphology. The human morphology video prime was created using the image of 
a female wearing black pants and a black sleeveless shirt (Early Cognitive Development Centre, 
University of Queensland)(Figure 2). The size of the figure was approximately the same height 
and size as the point-light walker. At the beginning of each trial the image appeared at the top-
centre of the screen. The image then moved in a clockwise circle until it reached its starting 
location (15 seconds/ rotation).  
Random Motion. The random motion control video was constructed with the same 11 
point-light dots as the biological motion condition (Figure 3). Using VPixx© software (VPixx 
Technologies Inc.), each dot was assigned a fixed speed and a straight line of trajectory. Dots did 
not possess the characteristic movements of animate beings such as the ability to change speed, 
direction, or move contingently with any other dot. Random motion was selected as a control 
motion condition based on evidence that even when the motion of a human point-light walker is 
Random (i.e. contingencies and velocities of dots are reversed), it still contains perceptible 
animacy cues such as directionality (Troje & Westhoff, 2006). Thus, in the random motion 
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condition, directionality was controlled for by having approximately equal numbers of dots move 
towards the left, right, up and down.  
Design. 
Each participant was randomly assigned to one of the following three priming conditions: 
Biological Motion (n=22), Human Morphology (n=21), or Random Motion (n=21). 
Procedure.  
 For the administration of the priming task, a computer monitor measuring 61 centimeters 
was placed at the infant’s eye level at a distance of 104 centimeters from the infant. Three tall 
black panels (183 centimeters in height) provided a partition between the testing area and the 
computers used to administer the infant-controlled video primes. Using a Samsung video camera, 
infants’ attention to the video prime was observed on a computer monitor located behind the 
partition. Infants’ attention to the video prime was coded on-line by the experimenter using Habit 
2000© software (University of Texas). Each trial began with the presentation of an attention 
getter (moving green dot with bell sound), which oriented infants’ gaze to the screen. If infants 
looked away for a duration ≥ 2 seconds or if 15 seconds had elapsed, the attention getter was 
presented, and a new trial began. Infants were presented with a minimum of 4 and a maximum of 
14 trials to habituate.  Habituation criterion was defined as three consecutive trials where the 
infants’ looking time was less than 50% of their total looking time on the first three trials 
(Cohen, 2004). Infants who did not habituate in the allotted 14 trials were not included in the 
final analyses (n= 20).  
Object Examination Task 
The object examination procedure is based on the habituation-dishabituation paradigm, 
wherein infants are presented with several exemplars from one category (Trials 1-8), followed by 
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a novel exemplar from the same category (Trial 9), and finally a novel out-of-category exemplar 
(Trial 10). During Trials 1-8 the infant is habituated to a particular category (e.g. dog) using four 
different exemplars, each presented two times. Categorization is inferred if infants’ attention 
decreases during the habituation trials and increases with the presentation of the novel out-of-
category object (Trial 10), but not the novel within-category object (Trial 9).   
 Stimuli. Plastic replicas of dogs, fish and birds were used as exemplars from the animal 
category, while replicas of chairs, tables and beds were used as exemplars from the furniture 
category (see Figure 4 and 5). All objects were made of hard plastic, wood or metal and were 
approximately the same size.  
Design. Each infant completed two basic-level categorization tasks: one animal 
categorization task, consisting of either dog-bird or dog-fish contrasts and one furniture 
categorization task, consisting of either chair-bed or chair-table contrasts. The order of 
presentation (animal-furniture vs. furniture-animal) and the category of exemplars used at test 
(dog-bird vs. bird-dog) were counterbalanced.  
Procedure. The experimenter was seated across the table facing the infant while the parent 
sat to the right and slightly behind the infant, in order to stay out of the infants’ direct line of 
sight. Parents were instructed to interact with their infant as little as possible and not to name or 
point to any of the toys. Each categorization task consisted of 10 trials, each 20 seconds in 
duration. The experimenter began each trial by placing a toy in front of the infant and directing 
the infants’ attention by saying, “Look at this.” At the end of each trial the experimenter removed 
the toy and immediately administered the next trial. For the duration of the trial, infants were 
allowed to manipulate the toy as they pleased. If the infant did not show interest in the toy, no 
attempt was made to direct the infant. When the toy fell or was thrown out of reach, either the 
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experimenter or the parent placed the toy back on the table in front of the infant. All trials were 
20 seconds in duration and extra time was not given if the toy fell off the table.  
Coding and Reliability. Infants’ visual and manual examination behaviour on each trial 
was coded (Oakes et al., 1991; Ruff, 1986). Examination of toys was operationally defined as 
clearly focused attention which involved gaze direction, facial expression and object 
manipulation. Attention during banging or rapid waving of the object was not coded as 
examination. Coders recorded the duration of infants’ examination on each trial by pressing a 
key, which recorded the total examination time. A second experimenter, blind to which priming 
condition infants were exposed to coded 25% of the participants. Reliability for the two coders 
for the 15 randomly selected infants was r= .92 across all trials and r= .96 for the two test trials 
(9 and 10). The mean difference in infants’ examination time between coders was 1.13 seconds 
for trials 1 through 10 and 0.81 seconds for test trials 9 and 10 only.    
Control Tasks 
Gaze Following. The gaze following procedure used in this experiment was based on 
Brooks and Meltzoff (2002). While the infant was engaged in warm-up play at the table the 
experimenter placed two white cylindrical pedestals (20 centimeters) on the table at a 45 degree 
angle from the infants’ midline. Pedestals were constructed so that objects placed on them would 
be at the infant’s eye level. The experimenter knelt behind the table for the duration of the task. 
Two yellow ducks (16 cm X 9 cm) were placed on the pedestals and were oriented to face each 
other. Before the trial began, the experimenter removed the warm-up toys and said, “Hi (baby’s 
name)” to orient the infant to look at the experimenter. Once eye contact was established, the 
experimenter slowly turned her head to face the duck on the right. Each trial started when the 
experimenter began the head turn and lasted for a duration of 6 seconds. This trial duration was 
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selected based on previous research, which used trial lengths ranging from 5 to 7 seconds 
(Butterworth & Jarrett, 1991; Caron, Butler & Brooks, 2002; Moore & Corkum, 1998). 
Following each trial, the ducks were removed from the pedestals and the infant was given a toy 
to play with during the inter-trial interval (30 seconds). Four trials were administered with the 
experimenter alternating looking direction between right and left targets.  
Coding and Reliability. In accordance with standard practice in gaze following literature 
(Butler, Caron & Brooks, 2000; Johnson et al., 1998; Moore & Corkum, 1998) a Looking Score 
was computed based on infants’ performance on each trial. Infants’ first look was used to score 
each trial as correct (+1) if it matched the target of the experimenter’s head turn, incorrect (-1) if 
it was toward the opposite target, and non-look (0) if the infant did not look at either target. 
Infants’ Looking Score was calculated as the sum of correct (+1), incorrect (-1) and non-looks 
(0) across the four trials. Looking Scores, thus, had a possible range of values from -4 to +4. An 
infant’s first look was operationalized as the first shift in gaze from the mid-line (i.e. eye contact 
with the experimenter). Gaze following trials where the infant made eye contact with the 
experimenter, but looked away before the experimenter began the head turn were excluded. In 
addition, the average duration of the infants’ correct first looks was calculated by summing the 
average duration of each correct first look and dividing by the number of correct trials. Coding 
for the duration of infants’ correct first looks began as soon as infants shifted gaze from the mid-
line and ended when infants shifted from fixating on the target. The same independent examiner 
coded a random sample of 15 infants (25%). Using Cohen’s Kappa, inter-rater agreement was 
calculated for the following dependent measures: direction of infants’ first gaze (K=0.93; 96.6% 
agreement) and looking score (K=0.82; 85.7% agreement). Coder reliability for the duration of 
infants’ correct first looks was calculated as a correlation, r= 0.94. 
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Transparent Box Detour. The administration of this task, adapted from Diamond (1992), 
involved the retrieval of a toy from a clear Plexiglass box measuring 15 x 15 x 5 centimeters. 
The stimulus was constructed so that the box was missing the bottom and one side. The box was 
placed on the table so that there was only one open side. In order to retrieve the toy from the box, 
infants needed to determine the location of the open side and reach inside. Infants were presented 
with a choice of four attractive toys, which included a yellow rubber duck, a red truck, a key ring 
with fruit and a multi-coloured cube. The experimenter observed which toy the infant seemed to 
prefer as evidenced by the amount of time the infant spent looking at or playing with each toy, 
then proceeded to remove all the toys. In all trials, the box was centered in front of the infant, 
placed at a distance of about 10 centimeters away. The infant was permitted to push or pull the 
box to change its proximity and could take as long as he or she needed to retrieve the toy. To 
encourage the infant, the verbal cue “get the toy” was combined with pointing to the toy. The 
experimenter prevented the infant from lifting the box by placing two fingers on the upper back 
corners. If an infant was unsuccessful at obtaining the toy the experimenter provided two levels 
of prompting. In the first level of prompting the experimenter moved the box back and forth 
from left to right exposing and covering the toy (x3). If this prompt was unsuccessful the 
experimenter demonstrated how to retrieve the toy by reaching into the open side and taking the 
toy out and then placing it back inside (x3). If the infant was still unsuccessful, the trial ended 
and the infant was given one of the non-preferred toys to play with during the inter-trial interval 
(about 30 seconds). If the infant successfully obtained the toy, he or she was permitted to play 
with it during the inter-trial interval. The infant was administered two warm-up trials followed 
by four test trials. During the warm-up trials the opening of the box faced forward and the infant 
was expected to be able to retrieve the toy independently on at least one of these trials. Infants 
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who were unsuccessful with the warm-up trials were not administered side-facing test trials as 
these trials were more difficult. Four test trials were administered in which the opening of the 
box alternated between facing left and right.  If the infant was not successful on either of the first 
two trials and did not benefit from the experimenter’s prompting, the second two trials were not 
administered to avoid unnecessary frustration for the infant.  
Coding and Reliability. Trials where the infant lifted the box to obtain the toy were not 
coded. Additionally, trials in which the infant obtained the toy during the experimenter’s prompt 
demonstration (i.e. when the toy was not placed in the centre of the box or when the 
experimenter’s hand was still in the box) were not coded. All other test trials were coded using 
the behavioural coding scheme suggested by Diamond (1990) and Bell and Fox (1992). 
Strategies used by the infant to obtain the toy were coded according to four phases, which are 
indicative of the infants’ developmental level. Infants who reached exclusively in their direct line 
of sight and consequently were unable to obtain the toy scored a Phase 1. Phase 1 performance 
included persistent hitting and scratching the closed sides or top of the box. Infants who scored 
Phase 2 retrieved the toy from the side openings by manipulating the box or bending forward so 
that the opening could be seen. Phase 2 performance also included infants who reached for the 
toy using their “awkward hand” (e.g. using their right hand to obtain the toy from the left side 
opening). In Phase 3, infants bent to look at the toy through the opening but did not need to 
maintain visual contact with the toy being retrieved. These infants were able to obtain the toy 
using their same-side hand (e.g. using their right hand to obtain the toy from a box with an 
opening on the right side). Infants who scored Phase 4 were able to determine the location of the 
open side by feeling the box and inserting their same-side hand to retrieve the toy. In Phase 4, 
infants did not need to look at the toy through the open side of the box in order to retrieve it. For 
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each trial, infants were assigned a score of 1 through 4. Infants were also assigned an overall 
score for both the highest phase they obtained independently and the highest phase obtained with 
prompting. A subset of 15 infants (25%) were coded by an independent observer. Inter-rater 
agreement was calculated for the highest phase assigned for independent responses, K= 0.81 





 During the administration of all four tasks, participants were seated in an infant seat 
attached to a table while the parent sat behind them to their left side. Infants who became fussy 
were placed on their parent’s lap and parents were told not to look at the screen. Each participant 
was assigned to one of three video prime conditions where they viewed either a point-light 
display video of a person walking, a video of a static image of a human body or a control video 
containing randomly moving point-light dots (see Figures 1-3).  Following priming, infants 
completed an animate and an inanimate object examination task, presented in counterbalanced 
order. The presentation of control tasks measuring infants’ gaze following (Meltzoff, 2005) and 
executive functioning abilities (Bell & Fox, 1992) was also counterbalanced and was 
administered either before or after the priming and object examination tasks. That is, the object 
examination task always followed priming, while the control tasks were either administered 
before or after.  The gaze following and executive functioning tasks were administered to show 
that a) infants assigned to each of the three groups were of approximately equal cognitive ability 





A one-way ANOVA revealed that infants placed in the Biological Motion, Human 
Morphology and Random Motion conditions did not differ with respect to age, F (2, 61)= 0.26, 
p= 0.77, (mean ages for the Biological Motion, Human Morphology and Random motion groups 
were 10.29, 10.26, and 10.26 months, respectively), or combined number of words known 
receptively and/or expressively, F (2, 61)=2.55, p= 0.09, (mean number of words for the 
Biological Motion, Human Morphology and Random motion were 15.73, 17.52, and 9.86, 
respectively). During the video priming infants did not differ in terms of the number of trials 
taken to habituate in each condition, F (2, 61)= 1.98, p=0.14, (mean number of trials for the 
Biological Motion, Human Morphology, and Random Motion were 8.10, 9.79, and 9.13, 
respectively). Whether or not infants habituated did not significantly differ across priming 
condition, χ2(2, 94)= 4.45, p= 0.11, (mean proportion of infants who habituated in the Biological 
Motion, Human Morphology and Random motion were 0.91, 0.76, and 0.70, respectively).  
Additional analyses tested whether order of presentation of the various tasks influenced 
infants’ performance.  In the Biological Motion and Human Morphology prime conditions, 
infants’ performance on the control tasks did not significantly differ as a function of whether 
they completed these tasks before or after priming: gaze following looking score, t(37)= -0.18, 
p= 0.86 (M before= 1.48, M after= 1.57), proportion of correct gaze following trials, t(37)= 0.13, 
p= 0.90 (M before= 0.60, M after= 0.59), proportion of success on the detour task, t(36)= 1.48, 
p= 0.89 (M before= 0.27, M after= 0.25), and highest detour phase achieved independently, 
t(34)= 0.78, p= 0.44 (M before= 2.36, M after= 2.00).  These results suggest that priming does 
not influence infants’ performance on tasks which measure gaze following and executive 
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functioning abilities, thought to be unrelated to infants’ development of animate-inanimate 
concepts.  
Object Examination. To analyze infants’ performance during the habituation phase, the 
mean examination time on the first block of trials (Trials 1-4) was compared to the second block 
of trials (Trials 5-8) to determine whether infants habituated to each category of objects. A 2 
(Habituation Block [T1-T4/T5-T8]) x 3 (Condition [BM/HM/RM]) x 2 (Category [Animate/ 
Inanimate]) analysis of variance revealed a significant main effect for Habituation Block, F (2, 
61)= 133.92, p<0.01 (M of Block 1= 10.1, M of Block 2= 7.7).  Pairwise comparisons (with 
Bonferroni correction) revealed significant differences in infants’ examination between 
habituation blocks 1 and 2 (Block 1: mean difference ranged from -0.86 to -2.02; Block 2 mean 
difference range -0.39 to -2.39) and no significant difference in infants’ habituation responses 
across experimental conditions (mean difference in examination between habituation blocks in 
the Biological Motion, Human Morphology and Random motion were 2.38, 3.07, and 1.85, 
respectively). A trend for a Habituation Block x Condition interaction was found, F (2,61)= 2.84, 
p= 0.07, however, post hoc comparisons revealed no significant interactions. No Habituation 
Block x Category interaction, F (2, 61)= 0.17, p=0.69, and no Habituation Block x Condition x 
Category interaction, F (2, 61)= 0.55, p=0.58 were found.   
A mixed factorial ANOVA with Condition (BM, HM, RM) as between subjects factor and 
both Category (Animate/ Inanimate) and Trial (8, 9, 10) as within subjects factors was computed 
to test the effect of priming on infants’ ability to categorize animate and inanimate object 
contrasts (see Table 1). This analysis revealed a significant effect for trial, F (2, 122)= 30.49, 
p<0.01. Follow-up comparisons for the main effect of Trial revealed that infants’ examination 
increased significantly from Trial 8 to Trial 9 (M Difference= 1.42, p=<0.01), indicating that 
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they differentiated the novel within-category object. Comparisons between Trial 9 and Trial 10 
indicated that the out-of-category object was also examined longer than the novel within-
category object (M Difference = 1.80, p<0.01).  
A significant Trial x Category interaction was also found, F (2, 122)= 3.11, p< 0.05. 
Follow-up comparisons (with Bonferroni corrections) revealed a significant increase in infants’ 
examination between Trial 9 and 10 (M difference= 3.11, p < 0.05) and Trial 8 and 10 (M 
difference= 2.60, p < 0.05) for the animate category objects (see Figure 6). These results suggest 
that infants were successfully able to categorize animate contrasts across priming groups. Infants, 
however, did not demonstrate successful categorization for inanimate category objects as 
evidenced by a non-significant increase in examination between Trial 9 (novel within-category) 
and Trial 10 (novel out-of-category), M difference= 1.00, p= 0.43. Infants, however, did respond 
to within-category novelty as evidenced by a significant increase in examination time between 
Trial 8 and Trial 9, (M difference= 2.33, p< 0.05).     
Although no significant Condition x Category x Trial interaction was observed, planned 
comparisons (with Bonferroni corrections) of infants’ performance on test trials 9 and 10 were 
conducted to test the hypothesis that biological motion and human morphology priming facilitate 
infants’ ability to categorize animate, but not inanimate contrasts. The use of planned contrasts 
when experimental conditions have been designed to test specific a priori hypotheses is 
recommended (Kline, 2004). These tests revealed that both Biological Motion and Human 
Morphology primed infants’ ability to categorize animate [BM: t(20)= 3.57, p= 0.002, Cohen’s 
d=0.83; HM: t(20)= 3.09, p= 0.006, Cohen’s d= 0.86], but not inanimate [BM: t(20)=1.64, 
p=0.12, Cohen’s d= 0.45; HM: t(20)= 0.66, p= 0.52, Cohen’s d= 0.14] pairs. In contrast, the 
Random Motion condition did not prime infants’ ability to categorize animate [t(20)= 0.96, p= 
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0.35, Cohen’s d=0.22], or inanimate [t(20)= 0.42, p=0.68, Cohen’s d= 0.14] contrasts (see Figure 
7).  
Control Tasks     
 Infants assigned to each experimental condition (Biological Motion (n=22), Human 
Morphology (n=21), Random Motion (n=21)) did not differ in their performance on either the 
gaze following or transparent box detour task (see Figure 8). These results are described below.   
Gaze Following.  Infants’ mean looking score on the gaze following task was 1.38 (SD= 
1.59; possible range -4 to +4) and the average duration of correct first looks was 1.10 seconds 
(SD= 0.55). A one way ANOVA revealed no group differences in infants’ looking score on the 
gaze following task, F (2, 53) = 0.67, p= 0.52 or infants’ average duration of correct first looks, 
F (2, 53)=0.19, p=0.83 across the three conditions.    
Detour Task. On the transparent box detour task, the highest phase level infants obtained 
independently was 2.23 (SD= 1.36) indicating that, on average, infants were able to obtain the 
toy without prompting from the experimenter when the box opening was oriented either to the 
left or right. When infants were taught how to obtain the toy, the highest phase level infants 
obtained with prompting was 2.63 (SD= 1.40), indicating that, on average, infants were better 
able to obtain the toy with prompting from the experimenter and did so using more sophisticated 
means (e.g. more infants reached with the “same side” hand). No group differences were found 
in infants’ performance on the detour task for the highest phase level infants obtained for 
independent performance, F (2, 48)= 0.58, p= 0.56, and in the case of the highest phase level 






Results of the present study suggest that both human biological motion and morphology 
facilitate infants’ ability to categorize animate, but not inanimate contrasts. These results support 
our hypothesis that infants use both object morphology and motion characteristics to differentiate 
object categories. That infants in the human morphology condition were better able to categorize 
basic-level animate, but not inanimate contrasts, is consistent with previous research 
demonstrating that infants use object morphology (features, parts, etc.) to make category 
discriminations at varying levels of abstraction (Cohen & Younger, 1983; Quinn & Eimas, 
1996). However, the current research is the first to test whether animate motion cues, 
specifically, biological motion, also aid infants’ ability to categorize.  
In the biological motion condition, infants were primed with a point-light display of a 
human walking and subsequently completed two basic-level categorization tasks. The human 
point-light walker was selected to provide a conservative test of infants’ understanding of 
biological motion as characteristic of all living beings. Using this prime, facilitation of infants’ 
performance on the categorization task required that infants generalize principles of human 
biological motion to other perceptually different members of the animate category, such as dogs, 
fish and birds. That infants’ performance on the animal categorization task was facilitated by 
human biological motion suggests that infants possess a broad concept of animates which 
includes both humans and animals. Thus, results of the current study both support and extend 
previous research (Arterberry & Bornstein, 2002; Cohen & Younger, 1983; Mandler, 1992; 
Quinn & Eimas, 1996, 1998; Rakison & Poulin-Dubois, 2001) by showing that infants as young 
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as 10 months possess a broad concept of animate which is grounded in both morphology and 
motion analysis.  
While it is possible that infants’ ability to group humans and animals in the current 
experiment may be explained by the hypothesis that infants’ concept of ‘human’ broadly 
includes members of the animal kingdom, as suggested by Quinn and Eimas (1998), research 
using the object examination procedure has shown that infants are already able to differentiate 
animals from humans by 10 months-of age (Oakes, Plumert, Lansink & Merryman, 1996). Since 
10-month-olds are able to differentiate animals and humans, yet, infants in the current 
experiment preferred to treat each as members of the broader animate category, it seems likely 
that infants possess a basic conceptual understanding of the animate-inanimate domain. 
The current experiment tested 10-month-olds’ ability to categorize contrasts belonging to 
the superordinate animal (dog-bird, dog-fish) and furniture (chair-table, chair-bed) categories. 
Within the context of previous research using the object examination procedure, Pauen (2002) 
found that the basic-level ability to categorize dogs vs. birds and chairs vs. tables emerges 
between 8 and 12 months of age. In the current study, 10-month-old infants successfully 
categorized basic-level animal contrasts (dog-bird and dog-fish), but were not able to categorize 
basic-level furniture contrasts (chair-table and chair-bed). Although it may be tempting to 
speculate that the developmental precedence of acquiring animal categories before furniture 
categories can be extended to the animate-inanimate domain (e.g. infants acquire concepts of 
animates before inanimates), previous research does not support this hypothesis (Mandler, 1993). 
In a study comparing animal (dog-fish, dog-rabbit) and vehicle (car-airplane, car-motorcycle) 
contrasts, Mandler found that 9-month-old infants successfully categorized the vehicle contrasts 
but were unsuccessful in categorizing the animal contrasts. In sum, research to date suggests that 
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by 10 months of age infants can successfully differentiate basic-level animal and vehicle pairs, 
however, they are not able to differentiate furniture pairs until 12 months of age. 
Limitations and Future Directions. In the current study, the complexity of our design 
proved to be a notable limitation as it reduced our ability to satisfy the sample size required to 
conduct our analyses with adequate statistical power. In computing a 3 x 2 x 2 ANOVA with an 
estimated sample size of n=60 and an estimated effect size of 0.25 the a priori power was 
estimated to be about 0.6 (60% probability of detecting an effect). Given that the current study 
sought to use priming to boost infants’ performance on tasks they were already performing with 
some degree of accuracy, the estimated effect of priming was thought to be relatively small. 
Thus, in order to test whether the desired effect was obtained, planned comparisons with 
Bonferroni corrections were used. To provide an estimate to the total variance explained, effect 
size estimates were included in the current analyses.   
An additional limitation in the current study was that only one level of categorization 
abilities (basic-level) could be tested using the object examination procedure, given that 10-
month-old infants have already mastered superordinate level categorization of animal-vehicle 
(Mandler & McDonough, 1993; Oakes, Madole & Cohen 1991), animal-people (Oakes, Plumert, 
Lansink, & Merryman, 1996), and animal-furniture (Mandler & McDonough, 1998; Pauen, 
2002) contrasts using this method. The use of basic-level pairs in the current study limited our 
ability to make inferences concerning the question of whether biological motion facilitates 
infants’ ability to differentiate animate from inanimate. Rather what we have shown is that 
infants are better able to differentiate two classes of animate objects (e.g. dogs and birds or dogs 
and fish) following exposure to biological motion.  In order to show that biological motion is 
pivotal to the development of the animate-inanimate distinction in infancy it would be necessary 
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that the current study be extended using a categorization procedure in which the facilitation of 
superordinate categorization abilities can be assessed. Ongoing research in our laboratory is 
currently testing whether biological motion primes 12-month-olds’ ability to categorize animals 
and vehicles (superordinate level) using the sequential touching procedure. Replication and 
extension of the current study in an experiment testing whether animate motion and morphology 
prime infants’ ability to categorize at a broader level should strengthen our ability to adopt a rich 
interpretation of infants’ abilities. Specifically, that infants possess conceptual knowledge of the 
animate domain and use this knowledge to differentiate object categories at varying levels of 
abstraction. A thorough understanding of the components involved in the development of 
categorization abilities in typically developing infants will provide a basis for future 
investigations concerning how this process may differ among individuals with Autism Spectrum 
Disorder (ASD).  To date, deficits in the perception of biological motion have already been 
identified in this population (Annaz et al., 2009; Blake et al., 2003).  Thus, future research may 
examine whether difficulties in the perception of biological motion (e.g. showing a lack of visual 
preference for biological motion) predict difficulties in individual’s ability to categorize at 
various levels of abstraction. Finally, the use of an experimental methodology to compare and 
contrast the process involved in category learning among typically developing infants and 
individuals with ASD may ultimately lead to the development of new intervention strategies to 
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Figure 4: Object examination animate stimuli (from top left clockwise): 
 
Dogs- standard poodle, husky, bernese, golden lab, dalmatian 
Birds- duck, eagle, rooster, goose, ostrich 


































Figure 5: Object examination inanimate stimuli (from top left clockwise): 
 
Chairs- rocking chair, living room chair, red chair, plaid kitchen chair, velvet dining room chair  
Tables- rectangular coffee table, blue kitchen table, oval coffee table, nightstand, children’s table 































       
Figure 6: Total examination time on each trial as a function of category 
 






















  Figure 7: Total examination time on test trials as a function of category and condition 
 
  Note: BM= Biological Motion, HM= Human Morphology, RM= Random Motion 
    
        p <0.01 
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Figure 8: Infants’ performance on control tasks 
 
































  8 to 9 1.42 0.37 <0.01 
9 to 10 1.80 0.47 <0.01 
Trial x 
Category b  
Animate 
8 to 9  0.51 0.49 ns 
9 to 10 3.11 0.59 <0.05 
8 to 10 3.11 0.59 <0.05 
Inanimate 
8 to 9 2.33 0.56 <0.05 
9 to 10 1.00 0.67 ns 




Table 1: Results of the mixed factorial ANOVA 
 
a  Main effect for Trial: F (2, 122)= 30.49, p<0.01 
b Trial x Category Interaction: F (2, 122)= 3.11, p< 0.05 
















                  
Appendices 
 
Appendix A: Parental Consent Form 
 
Parental Consent Form 
 
This is to state that I agree to allow my child to participate in a research project being conducted by Dr. 
Diane Poulin-Dubois, in collaboration with graduate student Kristyn Wright of Concordia University.  
 
A. PURPOSE 
I have been informed that the purpose of the research is to examine the development of concept 
formation during infancy and its relation to cognitive development.   
 
B. PROCEDURES 
The present investigation involves the presentation of two short animated videos and play-based tasks. 
In the first video, your child will watch animated objects (e.g. caterpillar, truck) moving on the screen. In 
the second video, moving objects will be depicted as dots. Following the video presentation, your child 
will have an opportunity to play with a variety of toys. What we would like to know is whether the video 
demonstration will influence your child’s interest in different categories of toys. Your child will also 
participate in two other activities with the experimenter. The first activity examines your child’s ability to 
follow the experimenter’s gaze to an object. The second activity examines problem solving and flexible 
thinking styles using a task that requires your child to obtain a desirable toy.  
 
The whole session should last approximately 45 minutes. During all tasks, your child will be sitting 
either on your lap or in a child seat and you will be seated directly behind. We will videotape your child’s 
responses and all tapes will be treated in the strictest of confidentiality.   
 
C. RISKS AND BENEFITS 
Your child will be given a certificate of merit at the end of the session as a thank-you for his/her 
participation. Also, you will be offered 20$ for your participation. 
 
There is one condition which may result in the researchers being required to break the confidentiality of 
your child’s participation. There are no procedures in this investigation that inquire about child 
maltreatment directly. However, by the laws of Québec and Canada, if the researchers discover 
information that indicates the possibility of child maltreatment, or that your child is at risk for imminent 
harm, they are required to disclose this information to the appropriate agencies. If this concern 
emerges, the lead researcher, Dr. Diane Poulin-Dubois, will discuss the reasons for this concern with 
you and will advise you of what steps will have to be taken.  
 
D. CONDITIONS OF PARTICIPATION 
 I understand that I am free to withdraw my consent and discontinue my participation at any time 
without negative consequences, and that the experimenter will gladly answer any questions that 
might arise during the course of the research. 
 I understand that my participation in this study is confidential (i.e. the researchers will know, but will 
not disclose my identity).                                                
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 I understand that the data from this study may be published, though no individual scores will be 
reported. 
 
I HAVE CAREFULLY STUDIED THE ABOVE AND UNDERSTAND THIS AGREEMENT. I FREELY 
CONSENT AND VOLUNTARILY AGREE TO HAVE MY CHILD PARTICIPATE IN THIS STUDY. 
  
MY CHILD’S NAME (please print) _____________________________________ 
 
MY NAME (please print) _____________________________________________ 
 
   SIGNATURE ____________________________ DATE ____________________ 
 
WITNESSED BY _________________________ DATE ____________________ 
 
I would be interested in participating in other studies with my child in the future (yes/ no): _____     
 
If at any time you have questions about your rights as a research participant, you are free to contact 
Adela Reid, Research Ethics and Compliance Officer, Concordia University, at (514) 848-2424 ext 7481 
or by email at areid@alcor.concordia.ca  
 
       ______________________                                             ___________________                                                          
       Diane Poulin-Dubois, Ph.D.                                                               Kristyn Wright, B.A. hons. 
                                                       
       Professor                                                            M.A. Candidate                                           
       Department of Psychology                                                                   Department of Psychology           
       848-2424 ext. 2219                                                                      848-2424 ext. 2279                      
       diane.poulindubois@concordia.ca                                                        kr_wrigh@live.concordia.ca             




   Participant # _____________    Researcher: ___________________ 
 
 
  Participated in other studies during the same visit: 
 









                
Appendix B: Demographics 
Participant Information 
 
Infant's first name:     Date of Birth:      
Infant’s last name:          Gender:     
Language(s) spoken at home (and other places):                                                                                                     
Mother's first name:                                         Father’s first name: _______________ 
Mother’s maiden name:                                                 Father's last name:   
Address:                     City:                       
Postal Code:            E-mail: ___________________________ 
Telephone #:  ______      home     work  
         ________________mom            work dad 
Mother's occupation:                     Father's occupation:                
Mother’s education (highest level attained):                                          
Father’s education (highest level attained):                                 
Mother’s marital status:         Father’s marital status:                  
 
Please answer the following general information questions about your child: 
Birth weight:    Length of pregnancy:  weeks 
Birth order:   (e.g., 1 = 1st child) 
Number of children in family:   
Were there any complications during the pregnancy?      
Has your child had any major medical problems?                     
Does your child have any hearing or vision problems?                    
 
 
** Have you ever been contacted by another university to participate in one of their studies?      
(Yes/No):                                                        
** If you answered yes, please name the university:                                                      
 
Participant # :                     Researcher:    
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